Saturday, January 28, 2006

A Conversation

-- Do you love her? he asked.
-- I think I do.
-- You "think"?
-- Yes, I think.
-- Perhaps you think too much.
-- Perhaps you think too little.
-- Nevermind.
-- ...
-- So how do you know you love her?
-- Well, I don't know, really.
-- Then you don't love her.
-- Why do you say that?
-- It's true!
-- ...and helpful.
-- No, seriously though: you must know that you love her.
-- But I don't know.
-- Then you don't love her.
-- But I do, I think.
-- You do, then?
-- I think.
-- You know.
-- I don't know.
-- ...
-- ...
-- Well, I can't know for you.
-- Right. You can't know for me.
-- I mean, I would if I could...
-- Right, but you can't. I see. No worries.
-- ...
-- ...
-- So, one more question.
-- Yea?
-- Do you love her?
-- I've said I don't know.
-- Yes, I suppose you have.
-- Yes.
-- Well, can you be saved without her?
-- ...

Monday, January 23, 2006

Cultural Assimilation and British Arrogance

I came out of the Bodleian (Oxford's main library) this afternoon and saw some folks taking pictures of a nearby building. ''Tourists!'' I thought to myself, scoffingly.

I would say that I'm assimilating into British culture quite well.

Adam

Saturday, January 14, 2006

Westminster Abbey


This is likely the best known, least attended church in the world. The congregation is so small that the staff has begun to charge 8 pounds ($13, roughly) for tours just to keep the place up. England is a country rich in theological tradition, but, currently, it is spiritually vacuous. Which only confirms a thought I've been having lately: I don't mind if you're not religious. Naturally, I want you to be religious, but I certainly can't force it. What I can barely stand, though, is people who are religious, but only half-heartedly so. I would rather someone declare, openly and fervently, that they are proudly irreligious, rather than claim some empty, contentless form of spirituality. If you don't believe that Jesus is God, that God is triune, that Jesus is redeeming the world, (etc.) you can't possibly be Christian. And there's no need masquerading about with illusions to the contrary.

Blair? B-liar?


The best picture I took all day. This series of signs protesting the war in Iraq was arranged on a long fence directly across the street from the Parliament Building (see below). But the oddity in the middle of this photo caught my attention. In fact, it's probably the best bit of wordplay I saw all day.

"The great globe itself" -- Shakespeare


This is it: Shakespeare's globe. Well, not the original version, which probably burned down at some point, like every other interesting structure in England. But it is a close model. And they still perform plays here. If you're a student, you can get in for 5 pounds and stand (stand!) on the floor in front of the stage. But it's okay, since you can also shout at the actors if you like.

London Tower


This "tower" (which, I think we can all agree, stretches that particular English noun to its limit) dates to around 1066, when William the Conqueror defeated Harold at the Battle of Hastings and assumed the English throne.

Big Ben


Pretty much a big clock.

Prime Minister Tony Blair's Office


This is Tony Blair's office (nice pic, eh?). It was closed to the public in 1984, at which time it was not, of course, Tony Blair's office. In any case, this is apparently where he does all his official business, like thinking of ways to respond in the third person to questions addressed to him in the third person during the weekly session of "Prime Minister's Questions".

The Houses of Parliament



This is building that holds the British Houses of Parliament. The House of Commons in on the left end, and the House of Lords is on the right.

Buckingham Palace


The Queen's official residence and likely the best known landmark in London. Not much to see, really. There was apparently an important event going on today: a marching band, a couple of horses, and hoards of short little men wearing ridiculous black hats.

Wednesday, January 11, 2006


Dr Richard Cross, Theology

I'll be studying St. Thomas Aquinas with Dr. Cross, a tutor at Oriel College.

Us at the airport

Friday, January 06, 2006

Baudelaire: A Metaphor

One of the greatest French poets of the 19th century, Charles Baudelaire (1821-1867) was born in Paris and lived there most of his life. Sometimes called the "father of modern criticism," Baudelaire stunned many of his contemporaries with compelling images of decay and lust--images that eventually led to the censorship of some of his best poems. In fact, when Les fleurs du mal (The Flowers of Evil), Baudelaire's best-known collection of poems, appeared in 1857, everyone involved in the publication process was indicted and found guilty of obscenity and blasphemy.

Throughout his life, Baudelaire apparently had a enigmatic relationship with his own sexuality. On the one hand, the poet clearly recognized--and was tantalized by--the pleasure of sexual activity, but nevertheless was unable to escape the suspicion that sexual involvement was a form of impurity--residue, perhaps, of original sin. In "Chanson d'après-midi" ("Afternoon Song"), for instance, he writes:

Quoique tes sourcils méchants (Although your malicious eyebrows)
Te donnent un air étrange (Give you a strange air)
Qui n'est pas celui d'un ange, (Which is hardly that of an angel)
Sorcière aux yeux alléchants, (Sorceress with enticing eyes)

Je t'adore, ô ma frivole, (I adore you, my frivolity)
Ma terrible passion! (My terrible passion)
Avec la dévotion (With the devotion)
Du prêtre pour son idole. (Of a priest for his idol)

Here the object of the poet's sexual desire is presented as a temptress, an enchanter. In the first stanza, Baudelaire focuses on his lover's face, particularly her eyes, employing adjectives like "méchant" (malicious) and "alléchant" (enticing). The poet's inclusion of the appelation "Sorcière" (sorceress or witch) lends color and depth to the two previous adjectives and establishes the supernatural tone of the entire poem. In the second stanza, the theme of the forbiddenness and danger continues, but now the poet openly admits that he he loves the girl, "frivole" though she may be. What's more, he continues to employ language that suggests a kind of tension between his sexual attraction and the suspicion that his "beloved" may be no more than a Keatsian "belle dame san merci." This theme culminates near the end of the second stanza with the poem's most potent metaphor: "...Avec la dévotion / Du prêtre pour son idole". Here again, the notion of forbidden or dangerous love appears, this time tempered by the religious imagery of a priest clutching an idol.

This conception of love (particularly coital love) as impure, heretical, or idolatrous has a long and ilustrious history. But for Baudelaire, its sting is particularly strong, as if some kind of insidious evil inheres in the sexual act itself. Indeed, as the poet himself put it: "Faire l'amour, c'est faire le mal" ("To make love is to do evil"). But the equation of "love" and "evil" is far too simple. There is, must be, something deeper at work. And, in my view, that "something" rests squarely on Baudelaire's image of the priest and his idol. To see what I mean, consider another, very different story. At the end of Exodus 31, Moses has ascended Mount Sinai to rendezvous with Yahweh. And, by all accounts, his stay has lasted longer than anticipated. Thus the opening verse of chapter 32: "When the people saw that Moses delayed to come down from the mountain...." The Israelites, it seems, have grown impatient with their leader and, in his absence, make a new request: "the people gathered themselves together to Aaron and said to him, 'Up, make us gods who shall go before us. As for this Moses, the man who brought us up out of the land of Egypt, we do not know what has become of him'." The rest of the story is familiar enough. Aaron gathers up everyone's golden rings and fashions a calf. Moses soon comes down the mountain and, in his anger, smashes the tablets bearing the Ten Commandments onto the ground (if you're having trouble, just think Charlton Heston, circa 1956). What interests me here, though, is not Heston, but rather the status of the golden calf. In one sense, it is doubtless an idol that shall "go before" the people. More importantly, however, the golden calf is a kind of consolation or substitute, one ultimately born out of the Israelites' impatience (see above: "delayed").

And it is in this sense, I think, that we should understand the relationship between Baudelaire's antagonism toward sexual love and his image of the priest's idol. Sex, for the poet, seems to be a kind of replacement, a makeshift substitute that reveals an impatience with the arduousness of authentic love. As Columbian novelist Gabriel García Márquez puts it in his latest offering, "El sexo es el consuelo que uno tiene cuando no le alcanza el amor" ("Love is the consolation that you have when you can't have love"). And "consolation" in the worst sense.

Tuesday, January 03, 2006

Rorty and Morality

Near the end of the introduction to The Consequences of Pragmatism, Richard Rorty makes a claim that many critics have taken as a sort of final confirmation of pragmatism's moral paralysis:

"Suppose that Socrates was wrong, that we have not once seen the Truth, and so will not, intuitively, recognize it when we see it again. This means that when the secret police come, when the torturers violate the innocent, there is nothing to be said to them of the form 'There is something within you which you are betraying. though you embody the practices of a totalitarian society which will endure forever, there is something beyond those practices which condemns you'."

Alister McGrath calls this approach a kind of "lazy pragmatism", and indeed, in Rorty's own words, recognizing our own philosophical impotence in the face of the secret police is "hard to live with." It seems to me, however, that such "philosophical impotence" (i.e., our lack of ability to appeal to absolute, transcendental standards to condemn a would-be executioner) is hardly peculiar to Rorty's approach. To see why, turn the tables for a moment and suppose, pace Rorty, that Socrates was right. Suppose further that a secret police officer comes to your door. Now what? In the first place, it seems obvious that whatever you say will likely be unconvincing. He's probably too vicious, or too "loyal" to the Führer, or just uninterested. Of course, you may claim to the secret policeman that "truth is on my side" or that there is "something beyond these practices which condemns you," just as easily as you may claim that the unicorn living under your bed will come haunt him at night. But this evades the central point: will our claim keep us safe? Will it cause the officer to drop his head in shame and resign his post?

My point, then, is that it is not at all clear that the belief in the privileged status of human beings--in a realm of transcendental values--will, in practice, shield us from the viciousness of the secret policeman at our door any better than Rorty's rejection of such principles. And, in this sense, both Rortian"relativism" and Englightenment absolutism are equally implicated. Neither gives us the moral resources we need to do what we want to do.

The question, then, is this: which alternative does a better job? On the one hand, is it true that our appeal to transcendental values (including the specially privileged status of human beings) will make our condemnation of the officer any more effective? Or, conversely, can we "get on better" without any such appeal? Rorty hedges his bets on the latter.